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OBSCENITY LAW: LE
DELUGE POSTPONED
T HE OMNIPRESENT PROBLEM of obscenity raises important legal issues
regarding the existence and extent of constitutional limitations to
the power of the states and of the federal government to regulate the
dissemination of obscene matter. The United States Supreme Court re-
cently decided two controversial cases concerning the scope of protection
afforded to obscenity under the Constitution. These cases-United States
v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs' and United States v. Reidel2-offered
the Court the opportunity to reevaluate the viability of the Roth doctrine
in light of the landmark decision of Stanley v. Georgia, wherein the
Court had held that mere private possession of obscene matter cannot
be constitutionally prohibited. 3 By seemingly qualifying the broad state-
ment in Roth v. United States4 that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press,"'5 the Stanley holding inspired
numerous courts6 to restrict further the Roth doctrine and several com-
mentators 7 to sound its deathknell. Diversity of interpretation s regarding
the impact of the Stanley case on the Roth doctrine necessitated clarifica-
tion by the Supreme Court.
* This article is a student work prepared by Michael J. Gaynor, a member of the
ST. JOHN's LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
It is a sequel to Obscenity Law: Apr~s Stanley, Le Deluge?, 17 CATHOLIC LAW.
45 (1971).
1 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
2 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
3 394 U.S. 557 (1969). For a compilation of articles regarding Stanley see Ob-
scenity Law: Apr~s Stanley, Le Deluge?, 17 CATHOLIC LAW. 45, 52 n.73 (1971).
4 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
5 Id. at 485.
6 See Obscenity Law: Aprds Stanley, Le Deluge?, 17 CATHOLIC LAW. 45, 55-58
(1971).
7 Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REV.
185, 201 (1969); Karre, New Directions in Obscenity Regulation?, 48 TEXAS L.
REV. 646, 650 (1970); Katz, Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 203-04.
8 See Obscenity Law: Aprs Stanley, Le Deluge?, 17 CATHOLIC LAW. 45, 53 et seq.
(1971).
The purpose of this article is presenta-
tion and analysis of two major obscenity
cases. First, the history of the constitutional
status of obscenity is reviewed; second, the
Thirty-Seven Photographs case is examined;
third, the Reidel case is considered; finally,
the present state of this aspect of obscenity
law is summarized and possible modifica-
tion is discussed.
Background: From Roth through Stanley
The Supreme Court first addressed itself
to the constitutional problems posed by
obscenity in 1957, in Roth v. United States,
wherein the Court promulgated the two-
level theory of speech:
There are two categories of speech-
that entitled to first amendment scrutiny,
although after such scrutiny it may prove
subject to regulation; and that so without
importance or ideas that it is virtually per
se subject to regulation and raises no con-
stitutional issues."
The Court held, apparently without qual-
ification, that obscenity is not constitution-
ally protected expression, because it wholly
lacks redeeming social value,10 and, there-
fore, need not be regulated under the "clear
and present danger"" or "balancing"'12
9 H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 46 (1965).
10 354 U.S. at 484-85.
11 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919):
The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.
12 "In each case [the court] must ask whether
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tests. A definitional or per se test was
fashioned: when material was challenged,
the determination to be made was whether
that material satisfied the elements of ob-
scenity, not whether it jeopardized a valid
community interest.
Subsequent decisions modified the two-
level theory of speech announced in Roth.'3
Expression otherwise nonobscene could be
encompassed within the broadened category
of nonspeech if pandered, 14 directed toward
specific sexually deviant groups, 15 inflicted
upon the unwilling, 16 or provided for juve-
niles. 17 Matter might be obscene per quod.' 8
The Court also has reconsidered its con-
clusion that obscenity is wholly unprotected.
Constitutional barriers to some exercises
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger." Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), quot-
ing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950), afl'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
13 For thorough discussion see Hayes, Obscen-
ity: The Intractable Legal Problem, 15 CATHOLIC
LAW. 5 (1969); Regan, An Unhurried Look at
Obscenity, 13 id. 297 (1967); Note, 12 id. 248
(1966); Hayes, Survey of a Decade of Decisions
on the Law of Obscenity, 8 id. 93 (1962).
14 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474
(1966).
15 Mishkin v. New York, 283 U.S. 502, 508
(1966).
16 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769
(1967) (per curiam).
17 For a thoughtful discussion of the problem
of obscenity in relation to juveniles, see Fagan,
Obscenity Control and Minors-The Case for a
Separate Standard, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 270
(1964).
18 See Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage
of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76
YALE L.. 127 (1966); Semanche, Definitional
and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's
New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1173 (1966).
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of a state's power to prevent distribution of
obscene material were recognized in Smith
v. California,19 wherein the Court again
stated that obscene expression is not consti-
tutionally protected but held that scienter is
essential to a bookseller's conviction for pos-
session of obscene matter.2 0 In New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan2' the Court opined
that "obscenity ... can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations"
and "must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment. '22 But the
Court also stated, in Ginzburg v. United
States,23 that obscenity is "inconsistent with
any claim to the shelter of the First Amend-
ment,' 24 and reaffirmed that position in
Ginsberg v. New York.25 Such was the
background to the Stanley v. Georgia case.
The Stanley case at once enlightened and
complicated the confusion regarding the
constitutional status of obscenity. Therein,
the Court distinguished public distribution
of obscene matter from its private posses-
sion,26 applied the "balancing" test, 27 and
held, under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, that the state's "broad power to
regulate obscenity ... does not extend to
mere possession by the individual in the
V) 361 U.S. 147 (1959); see Recent Decision, 6
CATHOLIC LAW. 240 (1960).
20 Id. at 152, 154.
21 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22 Id. at 269; see Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191,
201, 217-18 (inferring a breakdown in the two-
level theory of speech).
23 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
24 Id. at 475.
25 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
26 394 U.S. at 560-61.
27 Id. at 564-68.
privacy of his own home. '28 Further, the
Court asserted that Roth and its progeny
are not impaired by the Stanley decision,
apparently explaining this paradox by im-
plicitly limiting the Roth doctrine to recog-
nition of a legitimate governmental interest
in regulating obscenity and explicitly re-
stricting that interest to the public con-
text. 29 Unfortunately, the Court failed to
make itself perfectly clear.
The absence of explicitness encouraged
commentators to misread the Stanley opin-
ion. One commentator stated that
the Court has repudiated the major prem-
ise of the two-level theory that sexual ma-
terial meeting the obscenity definition is
wholly excluded from the first amendment.
A rejection of this premise is necessarily
a rejection of the two-level theory.30
Professor Engdahl similarly concluded
that the fundamental holding of the Roth
case-that obscenity is a discrete class of
expression, excluded from the constitu-
tional protection guaranteed to other kinds
of expression and therefore to be treated
differently from other kinds of expression
-has already met its demise.3 1
Professor Katz also interpreted the opinion
as "weaken[ing], if it does not destroy, the
theoretical premises and doctrinal content
of Roth v. United States, '32 and offered
this analysis of the decision:
Stanley suggests that Roth was dead wrong
28 Id. at 568.
29 Id. at 563-64.
30 Karre, supra note 7, at 650.
31 Engdahl, supra note 7, at 201.
32 Katz, supra note 7, at 203.
in its approach: obscenity is protected
speech subject only to regulation in the
interest of protecting the unwilling and the
young. Rather than state openly that Roth
was wrong, Stanley confines the premise
that obscenity is not protected as free
speech or press to the context of commer-
cial distribution. The Court here plays a
dangerous jurisprudential game. It is equat-
ing a general rule subject to qualification
(obscenity is not protected speech unless
privately possessed) with a qualification of
a contrary general rule (obscenity is pro-
tected speech unless commercially distrib-
uted). For First Amendment purposes it
makes a great deal of difference which
form the general principle takes. . . . The
effect of Stanley is to substitute a First
Amendment analysis for the much criticized
"double level" approach of Roth.3a
Professor Katz read the Stanley case as vest-
ing obscenity with constitutional protection
divestible upon a finding of obtrusion or of
distribution to minors. 3 4 These respected
commentators viewed the Stanley case as
a rejection of, and not an exception to, the
Roth doctrine.
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs
Contradictory constructions by lower
courts necessitated clarification, which was
forthcoming in United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs and in United States v.
Reidel. The operative facts in Thirty-Seven
Photographs are simple: Milton Luros re-
turned to the United States with thirty-
seven photographs, which customs agents
seized as obscene pursuant to § 1305(a)
of title 19.15 The United States Attorney
33 Id. at 210-11.
34 Id. at 217.
35 19 U.S.C. § 1,305(a) provides in pertinent
part:
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All persons are prohibited from importing
into the United States from any foreign country
• . . any obscene book, pamphlet, paper writ-
ing, advertisement, circular, print, picture,
drawing, or other representation, figure, or
image on or of paper or other material, or
any cast, instrument, or other article which is
obscene or immoral . . . . No such articles
whether imported separately or contained in
packages with other goods entitled to entry,
shall be admitted to entry; and all such articles
and, unless it appears to the satisfaction of the
collector that the obscene or other prohibited
articles contained in the package were inclosed
therein without the knowledge or consent of
the importer, owner, agent, or consignee, the
entire contents of the package in which such
articles are contained, shall be subject to seiz-
ure and forfeiture as hereinafter provided:
• . . Provided, further, That the Secretary of
the Treasury may, in his discretion, admit the
so-called classics or books of recognized and
established literary or scientific merit, but may
in his discretion, admit such classics or books
only when imported for noncommercial pur-
poses.
Upon the appearance of any such book or
matter at any customs office, the same shall be
seized and held by the collector to await the
judgment of the district court as hereinafter
provided: and no protest shall be taken to
the United States Customs Court from the
decision of the collector. Upon the seizure of
such book or matter the collector shall trans-
mit information thereof to the district attorney
of the district in which is situated the office
at which such seizure has taken place, who
shall institute proceedings in the district court
for the forfeiture, confiscation, and destruction
of the book or matter seized. Upon the adju-
dication that such book or matter thus seized
is of the character the entry of which is by
this section prohibited, it shall be ordered de-
stroyed and shall be destroyed. Upon adjudi-
cation that such book or matter thus seized is
not of the character the entry of which is by
this section prohibited, it shall not be excluded
from entry under the provisions of this sec-
tion.
In any such proceeding any party in inter-
est may upon demand have the facts at issue
determined by a jury and any party may have
an appeal or the right of review as in the
case of ordinary actions or suits.
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instituted forfeiture proceedings in the dis-
trict court. Luros denied that the photo-
graphs were obscene and presented a
counterclaim alleging that § 1305(a) is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied
to him. A three-judge district court de-
clared § 1305 (a) unconstitutional, enjoined
its enforcement against said photographs,
and ordered them returned to claimant
Luros. The judgment was based on two
grounds: first, that § 1305(a) failed to sat-
isfy the procedural requirements of Freed-
man v. Maryland,6 and second, that the
section could not validly be applied to the
seized material under Stanley v. Georgia.37
To the three-judge court claimant Luros
presented a five-fold constitutional attack
on § 1305, arguing that:
(1) It excludes from the United States
photographs imported for use by adults in
the privacy of their homes.
(2) It excludes photographs which are
to be distributed to adults only and in a
manner which will not invade the sensi-
tivities or privacy of anyone.
(3) It permits customs agents to seize
and hold pictures without a time restraint.
(4) It permits a seizure prior to an
adversary hearing.
(5) It is unconstitutionally vague.38
The basis of this assault was the Stanley
case, which claimant maintained forbade
any restraint upon obscene matter unless
36 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
37 309 F. Supp. 36, 37 (C.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd,
402 U.S. 363 (1971); see Comment, 23 ALA. L.
REV. 135 (1970).
38 Id. at 37.
there is danger that such material will reach
children or be forced upon people.3 9
Without rejecting the above construction
the court decided the case under a narrower
reading of the Stanley decision. Positing
that the right to possess obscene material
implies the collateral right to import it, the
court concluded that § 1305(a) contra-
venes the first and fourteenth amendments
because "[i]t prohibits a person who may
constitutionally view [obscene] pictures
. . . the right to receive them."4 0 Claim-
ant's admission that he intended to include
the photographs under consideration in a
book for distribution did not estop him
from attacking the validity of the statute.
Under Freedman v. Maryland, the court
reasoned, claimant had standing to show
that the statute is constitutionally over-
broad.41 Consequently, the court recognized
Luros' right to personally import obscene
matter into the United States and, appre-
ciative of the limited cultural opportunities
imposed upon the less affluent by their
economic condition, also recognized the
right of access to foreign obscenity by im-
portation through regular channels. 42
The court also considered the procedural
due process question raised by Luros. Un-
der Freedman v. Maryland, any restraint
before judicial determination must be brief
and safeguards must be provided in the
statute or by judicial construction if the
first and fifth amendments are not to be
contravened. 43 In the Thirty-Seven Photo-
30 Id.
40 Id. at 38; contra, United States v. Ten Erotic
Paintings, 311 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1970).
41 Id. at 37.
42 id. at 38.
43 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
260
graphs case the government sought judicial
determination as rapidly as possible under
the statutory procedures, seventy-six days
passing from the date of seizure to the date
of hearing.44 However, Luros was not as-
sured, either by statutory provision or judi-
cial construction, that there would be a
judicial determination of the forfeiture
within a specified brief period, so the court
held that the provision was unconstitutional
on this ground too. 45
Additionally, the court declined to con-
sider as unnecessary claimant's arguments
that the statute is unconstitutional because
it permits a seizure prior to an adversary
hearing, and that it is unconstitutionally
vague.46
The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded in a two-part opinion
by Justice White. Part I involved the ques-
tion of procedural due process under Freed-
man; Part II concerned the substantive
issue of the constitutional status of obscen-
ity under Stanley. Predictably, the Court
was divided.
Regarding Part I, Justice White, Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Harlan, Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Stewart, and Justice Blackmun
concluded that § 1305 (a) can be construed
as requiring administrative and judicial ac-
tion within specified time limits so as to
avoid the constitutional issue otherwise
raised under the Freedman case.47 The lat-
44 309 F. Supp. at 38.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 402 U.S. at 368.
When the validity of an act of Congress is
drawn in question, and . . . a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
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ter case involved a state statute, which is
not susceptible to authoritative construc-
tion by the Supreme Court.48 Section
1305 (a) being a federal statute, the major-
ity read into it the time limits required
under Freedman, thereby comporting with
legislative intent and furthering the policy
of construing statutes to avoid constitu-
tional issues. 49 Specifically, the majority
construed the section to require institution
of forfeiture proceedings within fourteen
days from the time of seizure, and final
decision in the district court within sixty
days from the filing of the action. 50 Addi-
tionally, there would be no invalidation of
seizure or forfeiture for delay caused by
the claimant or in those instances in which
administrative or judicial proceedings are
postponed while a three-judge court con-
siders those constitutional questions ap-
propriate only to it.51 Since forfeiture
proceedings in this case had been instituted
thirteen days after seizure, and a final de-
cision might have been made within sixty
days had Luros not caused a three-judge
court to be convened to determine the
validity of the statute, the Court held that
§ 1305(a) may be applied to the photo-
graphs in question, if on remand the ques-
tion of their obscenity is resolved in the
district court within sixty days, excluding
any delays caused by claimant. 52
principle that this court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
Id. at 369.
48 Id. at 369.
49 Id. at 372-73.
50 Id. at 373-74.
51 id. at 374.
52 Id. at 374-75.
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Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting,
concluded that reading time limits into the
statute is an unconstitutional usurpation of
legislative power. They believed that the
action by the majority is not supported by
Congressional deliberations or by previous
censorship cases. They gathered from the
legislative history that the Senate did not
choose to require prompt judicial review
and maintained that the decision whether
to rewrite the customs obscenity law is a
matter for Congress and not the Supreme
Court.5 3 In Blount v. Rizzi,5 4 decided
earlier in 1971, the Court had declined to
redraft a federal obscenity mail-blocking
statute to prevent its invalidation. Justices
Black and Douglas saw no basis for dis-
tinguishing the present case. 55
Justice Marshall did not comment upon
this aspect of the case.
Concerning Part II, Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan,
and Justice Blackmun, offered a plurality
opinion concluding that the Stanley case
did not impair Congress's power to re-
move obscene matter from the channels of
commerce. Specifically, these four justices
construed Stanley as not requiring "immu-
niz[ation] from seizure [of] obscene mate-
rials possessed at a port of entry for the
purpose of importation for private use." 50
They recognized no right infringeable by
the exclusion of foreign obscene matter.
That the private user under Stanley may
53 Id. at 383 et seq. (Black, J., dissenting).
54 400 U.S. 410 (1971), wherein the Court de-
clared that "it is for Congress, not this court, to
rewrite the statute." Id. at 419.
55 402 U.S. at 386 (Black, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 376.
not be prosecuted for possession of obscen-
ity in his home does not mean that he is
entitled to import it from abroad free from
the power of Congress to exclude noxious
articles from commerce. Stanley's empha-
sis was on the freedom of thought and
mind in the privacy of the home. But a
port of entry is not a traveler's home. His
right to be let alone neither prevents the
search of his luggage nor the seizure of
unprotected, but illegal, materials when his
possession of them is discovered during
such a search. . . . Whatever the scope of
the right to receive obscenity adumbrated
in Stanley, that right . . . does not extend
to one who is seeking, as was Luros here,
to distribute obscene materials to the pub-
lic, nor does it extend to one seeking to
import obscene materials from abroad,
whether for private use or public distribu-
tion. As we held in Roth v. United States,
. . . obscenity is not within the scope of
first amendment protection. Hence Con-
gress may declare it contraband and pro-
hibit its importation, as it has elected in
§ 1305(a) to do.57
These justices limited the Stanley decision
to recognition of a right to private posses-
sion of obscene matter and rejected the
argument that said right implied a collateral
right to import, thereby implying that the
alleged right to indulge in obscenity recog-
nized in Stanley is merely tolerated because
the alternative-invasion of privacy-is
more abhorrent.5"
57 Id. at 376-77.
58 See Gegan, The Twilight of Nonspeech, 15
CATHOLic LAW. 210, 218-19 (1969).
[Stanley] does not acknowledge a "right" to
undergo pornographic experiences in private
any more than the statute of frauds grants a
"right" to breach oral contracts. The law tol-
erates both because of uniquely remedial con-
siderations. The cure would be worse than the
disease. The recognition of this does not mean
Justice Harlan concurred in the judg-
ment, but concluded that the claimant, who
admitted importing the photographs for
commercial purposes, had no standing to
challenge the statute as constitutionally
overbroad on the ground that it applied to
importation for private use.5 9
Justice Stewart also concurred in the
judgment. He believed that seizure at the
border of obscene matter sought to be im-
ported for commercial dissemination is
permissible under the first amendment, but
did not agree that matter intended solely
for the private use of the importer can be
validly seized.60 Justice Stewart would not
limit Stanley to its facts.
Justice Marshall, author of the Stanley
opinion, read his effort as validating regu-
lation of obscenity only when taken to pro-
tect children or nonconsenting adults. He
argued that
• . . Stanley turned on an assessment of
which state interests may legitimately un-
derpin governmental action, and it is
disingenuous to contend that Stanley's con-
viction was reversed because his home,
rather than his person or luggage, was the
locus of a search.61
Concluding that the photographs were in
that society either values the disease or con-
siders it with indifference. Should the repellent
activity surface in circumstances not relevant
to privacy the law will step in. The privilege
recognized in Stanley is, in short, a shield for
the private citizen, not a sword for the pur-
veyor. 74
59 402 U.S. at 378. (Harlan, J., concurring),
citing Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 910 (1970).
60 Id. at 378-79 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 360 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Luros' purely private possession and of no
danger to anyone when seized, and believ-
ing that the states and the nation have
ample opportunity to safeguard their legit-
imate interests if commercial dissemination
occurs, he dissentedY2
Justices Black and Douglas, who con-
sistently have construed the first amend-
ment broadly, also dissented concerning
Part II. They again maintained that the
first amendment denies Congress the power
to censor books and movies and regretted
the Court's restatement of the Roth doc-
trine, i.e., that obscenity is not constitution-
ally protected expression. 63 These justices
maintained that Stanley implies that a man
can import obscene material for private use,
since "[t]he mere act of importation for
private use can hardly be more offensive
to others than is private perusal in one's
home."'64 Otherwise,
[t]he right to read and view any literature
and pictures at home is hollow indeed if
it does not include a right to carry that
material privately in one's luggage when
entering the country.65
Justices Black and Douglas saw no basis
for distinguishing importation for personal
use from mere private possession and,
therefore, concluded that those justices
subscribing to the plurality opinion would
either overrule Stanley or limit its applica-
tion to those instances in which "a man
writes salacious books in his attic, prints
them in his basement, and reads them in
his living room."'66
62 Id. at 361 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 379 (Black, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 381 (Black, J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 382 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Thus the Thirty-Seven Photographs case
was decided without a majority. Four jus-
tices denied that there is a constitutional
right to import obscene matter for private
use; one judge concurred in that judgment,
on the ground that the question was not
properly before the Court; and four justices
asserted that the aforementioned alleged
right does exist.
United States v. Reidel
The companion case to Thirty-Seven
Photographs was United States v. Reidel.
The operative facts in the latter case are
simple: Reidel advertised in a newspaper
the sale to adults of a booklet about im-
ported pornography and was indicted for
mailing copies in violation of § 1461 of
title 18, which proscribes knowingly using
the mails to deliver obscene matter.', He
67 The statute in pertinent part provides:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent,
filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or
substance; and-
Every written or printed card, letter, circular,
book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of
any kind giving information, directly or indi-
rectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by
what means any of such mentioned matters,
articles, or things may be obtained or made,
or where or by whom any act or operation of
any kind for the procuring or producing of
abortion will be done or performed, or how
or by what means conception may be pre-
vented or abortion produced, whether sealed
or unsealed;
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and
shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the
mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of
anything declared by this section to be non-
mailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered
by mail according to the direction thereon,
or at the place at which it is directed to be de-
livered by the person to whom it is addressed,
moved to dismiss the indictment, on the
ground that delivery of obscene material
through the mails to willing recipients who
claim to be adults is constitutionally pro-
tected under Stanley. The trial judge, who
ruled from the bench and did not write an
opinion, assumed, arguendo, that the book-
lets in question were obscene and, agreeing
with Reidel that § 1461 is unconstitutional
as applied to him, dismissed the indict-
ment." The Supreme Court reversed.6 9
Justice White delivered the majority
opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and
Blackmun joined. They decided this case
under Roth, wherein the Court had affirmed
a conviction under § 1461 for knowingly
mailing obscene matter and held that "ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press."70 The
Stanley decision was no obstacle to them,
for it concerned mere private possession
and, moreover, expressly stated:
or knowingly takes any such thing from the
mails for the purpose of circulating or dispos-
ing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or
disposition thereof, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, for the first such offense, and
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than ten years, or both,
for each such offense thereafter.
See Schmidt, A Justification of Statutes Barring
Pornography from the Mail, 26 FORDHAM L. REV.
70 (1957).
68 The district court decision accords with
United States v. Dellapia, 433 F.2d 1252 (2d
Cir. 1970), noted in 12 WM. & MARY L. REV.
691 (1971); United States v. Lethe, 312 F. Supp.
421 (E.D. Cal. 1970), noted in 49 TEXAS L.
REV. 575 (1971); United States v. Langford,
315 F. Supp. 472 (D. Minn. 1970).
69 402 U.S. at 352.
70 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), quoted id. at 354.
Roth and the cases following that decision
are not impaired by today's holding. As we
have said, the States retain broad power to
regulate obscenity; that power simply does
not extend to mere possession by the indivi-
dual in the privacy of his own home. 71
The constitutional protection afforded to
the assumedly obscene film in Stanley ap-
parently was dependent upon the scope of
the right of privacy in relation to the locus
therein involved, i.e., the home, and there-
fore consistent with the statement in Roth
that obscenity per se is not constitutionally
protected expression. 72
The personal constitutional rights of those
like Stanley to possess and read obscenity
in their homes and their freedom of mind
and thought do not depend on whether the
materials are obscene or whether obscenity
is constitutionally protected. Their rights
to have and view that material in private
are independently saved by the Constitu-
tion.73
Unlike Stanley, Reidel alleged a constitu-
tional right to traffic in obscene materials
and to employ the mails in pursuance
thereof. The Court reaffirmed Roth's ex-
clusion of such dissemination from con-
stitutional protection.
The District Court gave Stanley too wide
a sweep. To extrapolate from Stanley's
71 402 U.S. at 354, quoting 394 U.S. at 568.
72 These justices found this sufficiently clear to
justify summary affirmance in Gable v. Jenkins,
397 U.S. 592 (1970) (per curiam), aff'g 309
F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (three-judge
court). The lower court had strictly construed
the Stanley decision in upholding a state statute
prohibiting distribution of obscene matter to any
person. See Obscenity Law: Apr~s Stanley, Le
Deluge?, 17 CATHOLIc LAW. 45, 54 (1971).
73 402 U.S. at 356.
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right to have and peruse obscene material
in the privacy of his own home a First
Amendment right in Reidel to sell it to
him would effectively scuttle Roth, the
precise result that the Stanley opinion ab-
jured. Whatever the scope of the "right to
receive" referred to in Stanley, it is not so
broad as to immunize the dealings in ob-
scenity in which Reidel engaged here-
dealings which Roth held unprotected by
the First Amendment. 74
The constitutional question before it de-
cided, the Court offered in a noteworthy
postscript this analysis of obscenity law:
Roth and like cases have interpreted the
First Amendment not to insulate obscenity
from statutory regulation. But the Amend-
ment itself neither proscribes dealings in
obscenity nor directs or suggests legislative
oversight in this area. The relevant constitu-
tional issues have arisen in the courts only
because lawmakers having the exclusive
legislative power have consistently insisted
on making the distribution of obscenity a
crime or otherwise regulating such mate-
rials and because the laws they pass are
challenged as unconstitutional invasions of
free speech and press.
It is urged that there is developing sen-
timent that adults should have complete
freedom to produce, deal in, possess, and
consume whatever communicative mate-
rials may appeal to them and that the law's
involvement with obscenity should be lim-
ited to those situations where children are
involved or where it is necessary to prevent
imposition on unwilling recipients of what-
ever age. The concepts involved are said
to be so elusive and the laws so inherently
unenforceable without extravagant expen-
ditures of time and effort by enforcement
officers and the courts that basic reassess-
ment is not only wise but essential. This
74 Id. at 355.
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may prove to be the desirable and eventual
legislative course. But if it is, the task of
restructuring the obscenity laws lies with
those who pass, repeal, and amend statutes
and ordinances. Roth and like cases pose
no obstacle to such developments. 7
5
This statement is a welcome clarification
of the status of obscene matter constitu-
tionally and statutorily: obscenity is neither
constitutionally protected nor constitution-
ally prohibited; its regulation is exclusively
within the domain of the legislature, sub-
ject to possible constitutional infirmities
consistent with its constitutionally unpro-
tected status.
Justice Harlan, who joined in the opin-
ion of the Court, also wrote a concurring
opinion, wherein he approved the rejection
by the Court of the contention that Stanley
implies a right to receive obscene material
through any channel provided there are
sufficient safeguards to protect children and
nonconsenting adults. Such an interpreta-
tion, he asserted, would negate the essence
of the Roth holding by extending consti-
tutional protection to obscenity based upon
its content. For Roth authorizes proscrip-
tion and not mere regulation of obscenity,
and Stanley reaffirms Roth, thereby allow-
ing state and federal governments to re-
spond to the problem without establishing
legitimate interests. 76 However,
the power which Roth recognized in both
state and federal governments to proscribe
obscenity as constitutionally unprotected
cannot be exercised to the exclusion of
other constitutionally protected interests of
the individual. 77
75 Id. at 356-57.
76 Id. at 358 (Harlan, I., concurring).
77 Id. at 359 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The basis of the Stanley decision, Justice
Harlan concluded, is the idea that freedom
of thought necessitates prohibition of pun-
ishment for mere private possession of even
obscene matter, and
the "right to receive" recognized in Stanley
is not a right to the existence of modes of
distribution of obscenity which the State
could destroy without serious risk of in-
fringing on the privacy of a man's thoughts;
rather, it is a right to a protective zone
ensuring the freedom of a man's inner life,
be it rich or sordid.78
Justice Marshall concurred in the judg-
ment in Reidel. He believed that danger that
obscene matter would reach children was
inherent in the scheme under which Reidel
distributed his materials, for the only safe-
guard that Reidel took was a requirement
that purchasers declare their age, and con-
cluded that his conduct was violative of
a constitutionally valid construction of
§ 1461. 79
Justices Black and Douglas, who con-
strue the first amendment literally, again
dissented, on the ground that Congress
lacked the power to declare obscene mat-
ter nonmailable. They read Stanley as im-
plicitly suggesting the abandonment of the
Roth doctrine and deplored the Court's
reaffirmance of it.8°
Conclusion
The Thirty-Seven Photographs and
Reidel cases have clarified the impact of
78 Id. at 359-60 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 361-62 (Marshall, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 379-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
the Stanley decision on the Roth doctrine.
While the Court is divided, a majority of
its justices views Stanley's holding that mere
private possession of obscene matter is
constitutionally protected, as consistent with
Roth's exclusion of obscenity from consti-
tutional protection. The constitutional pro-
tection extended to obscenity in Stanley is
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based on the right of privacy, the material
itself not being entitled to constitutional
protection. The two-level theory of speech
is still the law. Obscenity is neither con-
stitutionally protected nor constitutionally
proscribed; its prohibition or regulation is
within the discretion of Congress and state
legislatures.
